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ABSTRACT 
 
Risk management is critical to the success of contemporary firms and while new technologies 
present opportunities for innovation and growth, they present new risks. Risk management of 
information systems and technology (IS/IT) is particularly critical because firms in almost all 
sectors of the economy are so dependent on it. We explore firms’ response to IS/IT risk 
management by analyzing their SEC-mandated regulation S-K risk disclosures. We find a lower 
than expected incidence of risk disclosures related to IS/IT and surmise that this result may be 
symptomatic of tension between firms’ need to comply and their need to appear to comply with the 
regulation, while at the same time presenting data that are valid, but which do not jeopardize 
potential investment. We explore three propositions related to IS/IT risk disclosures and discuss 
implications for research and practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
isk and reward in the development and use of information systems and technology (IS/IT) are both 
high. As IS/IT become ubiquitous, more powerful, and less costly, both business and society generally 
become increasingly dependent upon them. Rapid innovation in IS/IT combined with falling costs 
affect the potential risk and reward. Lower costs prompt more aggressive investments in newer technologies. Lower 
costs also affect perceptions of risk: no longer are functionally sophisticated IS/IT the exclusive possessions of 
corporate giants. Newer technologies like social networking, server and process virtualization and cloud computing 
present opportunities for rapid innovation. They also come with new, sometimes unrealized risks. 
 
The rapid changes present a significant challenge to those charged with managing risk and rewards. 
Accounting practice has evolved to finesse the processes and metrics used to manage reward: however, the field of 
risk management is less mature. At the enterprise level, risk management primarily involves the identification and 
evaluation of risks to the business. Emerging enterprise risk management (ERM) strategies facilitate intervention to 
identify, evaluate, mitigate, and report risks. 
 
In this study, we investigate the effect of the SEC’s Regulation S-K on risk disclosures made by pubic 
firms, and discuss how the disclosure process influences the greater area of risk management. We offer three 
propositions that address those effects and use empirical data to test them. Our focus is on IS/IT, as it provides the 
physical and logical infrastructure for more and more sectors of the economy, and thus we can reliably expect that 
all firms face risks in this area. Our analysis reveals that over 40% of Fortune 100 firms reported no IS/IT risks in 
either of the two years that risk disclosure was voluntary or in the first year that it was mandated by Regulation S-K. 
Additionally, nearly half of the industries represented in our sample had no firms list even one IS/IT risk factor. We 
contend that these findings are incongruous with industry reports and research indicating much greater IS/IT risk 
exposure facing organizations (e.g., Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Hines, 2007; Hodge, 2007; Romney & Steinbart, 2009; 
Kieke, 2006).    
 
Our paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline prior research into enterprise risk management, 
information systems governance, and Regulation S-K.  From this review, we develop our propositions and set out 
our research design. Subsequent sections present our results and provide commentary on our findings, observations, 
and opportunities for future research. 
R 
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ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT AND TODAY’S IS/IT RISKS 
 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) comprises a multi-step process of risk identification, evaluation, 
mitigation, and reporting. The aim of the process is to call attention to areas where management might intervene or 
institute additional oversight to ameliorate risk and prevent future losses; however, firms do not always recognize or 
realize the benefits of ERM. Beasley et al. (2009) reports that 62% of 700 for-profit, not-for-profit, and 
governmental entities surveyed indicate that (although) the volume and complexity of risks had increased 
substantially in the last five years, “…not all organizations are modifying their procedures for identifying, assessing, 
managing and communicating risk information to key stakeholders”. Also lacking is the development of a new 
organizational mindset that recognizes the wide variety of risks present in business. While some risks may be 
adequately addressed (i.e., market and credit risks for banks), there is a “real danger” that other types of risks are 
ignored (Maurer, 2009, 13). Critical to the success of contemporary business, information systems present 
challenges to risk management that have attracted attention both within the development and user communities and 
among regulators. 
 
Contemporary firms are so dependent on IS/IT that those systems have become ‘mission critical’. 
Increasingly rich electronic media support increasingly complex interactions and exchanges within and between 
firms. Today IS/IT support complex and continually evolving business processes: every facet of the firm from 
purchasing to accounting, production, sales, distribution, and logistics all depend on the efficient and effective 
operation of IS/IT. Growing dependence on the World Wide Web and web 2.0 capabilities such as server 
virtualization and cloud computing have further increased the complexity of both the processes and the technologies 
that support them (Sherer & Alter, 2004). Clearly, as business processes become increasingly interdependent and 
information intense, the risks associated with their failure or other interruption of services increase in complexity 
and volume. Regulatory compliance is also highly dependent on the proper functioning of IS/IT. Studies show that 
IS/IT is the most complex and costly to document in Sarbanes-Oxley compliance efforts, and that it should be 
considered a “high risk” area (Bryan, 2009, 34). The identification, assessment, and communication of risk is 
recognized as the core of effective IS/IT governance (O'Leary, 2000; Hunton et al., 2004; Cavusoglu et al., 2004). 
Recent  business failures have raised awareness of the risks surrounding IS/IT: inadequate controls have been cited 
as a significant risk factor (Solomon, 2005; Bryan, 2009). Such risks have been recognized by the U.S. government: 
in May 2009, President Obama created the role of cyber security czar to protect the nation’s digital infrastructure 
(Simpson & Cole, 2009). Highly publicized data theft incidents, as experienced by companies such as TJX and 
Heartland Payment Systems, have served to intensify the spotlight on IS/IT risk exposure (Acohido, 2009; 
SecurityFocus, 2007).   
 
REGULATION S-K AND PROPOSITION 1 
 
Regulation S-K was one result of the SEC’s intention to alert investors to the wide-ranging risks of 
purchasing and owning a company’s stock. Enacted in 2002, the regulation requires that companies disclose the 
most significant factors that may adversely affect the issuer’s business, operations, industry, financial position, or its 
future financial performance (Oppenheimer et al., 2005). In the financial services sector, the SEC has (since 1997) 
required firms to disclose information about market risk exposures from financial instruments (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 1997). However, the corporate accounting scandals and business gyrations of the early 
2000’s show clearly that firms face a multitude of other risks: many of these arise from the dependence of business 
processes on IS/IT. Regulation S-K mandates the communication of an organization’s broad risk exposure, and 
applies to all public companies. It seems likely that firms who were not engaging in effective risk management prior 
to the regulation may begin to implement and improve their risk management programs in response to the 
regulation.  
 
Because IS/IT are mission critical, one might expect firms to identify and disclose myriad IS/IT related 
risks. However, we have identified four factors from prior research that may adversely affect comprehensive 
identification and disclosure.  
 
 Firms may inadequately identify IS/IT risks 
 Firms may not appreciate the interconnectivity and synergy of IS/IT risks 
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 Firms may not see any benefit in disclosing those risks (and may in fact see negative outcomes) 
 Firms may view Regulation S-K not as a mandate to perform ERM, but merely as a burdensome 
compliance task, influenced by myriad legal and other pressures. 
 
We posit that the first factor, inadequate identification of IS/IT risks, arises due to the absence of consistent 
and coherent guidance on risk identification. Despite their substance and widespread adoption, IT governance 
frameworks such as COBIT, ITIL and ISO/IEC 17799 do not specifically provide guidance for assessing or 
addressing intra- or inter-organizational concerns and risks associated with the complex business processes 
supported by IS/IT (Sutton et al. 2008). ITIL provides guidance on best practices for IT service management; 
COBIT is primarily a high-level governance and control framework, and ISO/IEC17799 provides a framework for 
information security management. Their emphasis of events and other circumstances internal to the firm limit their 
capacity to accommodate the more emergent risk factors and the inter- and intra-organizational dependence on IS/IT  
that generate them.  
 
Relatedly, uneventful business operations may lull management into a false sense of security when it comes 
to their systems, leading them to underestimate and operate unaware of the critical risks they face.  Prior research 
shows that user communities and management tend to take IS/IT for granted. Sophisticated and successful 
operational use leads to an unrealized and largely underestimated dependence on IS/IT (Kieke, 2006). The risks 
associated with their failure do not take center stage when they are working smoothly. We surmise that 
organizations may be operating under a false sense of security whereby mission criticality is masked by the 
uneventful normal operation of IS/IT. Dependence is so complete that IS/IT becomes part of the undiscussed social 
routine, until the wheels come off. 
 
The second factor, failure to fully appreciate the variety and synergistic potential of the IS/IT risks that are 
identified,  is highlighted by Dehning et al. (2005), who caution against the narrow conceptualization of IS/IT risks, 
primarily because these risk factors are difficult if not impossible to measure directly. If management bases its 
decisions on a narrow and consequently rather naïve assessment of specific individual factors, the cumulative and 
consequential effects of such risks can be missed (op cit, 1004), giving rise to and perpetuating a vicious circle: 
underestimation leading to underreporting of risks.  
 
The third factor takes a cost/benefit approach and presumes that firms will not see any good coming from 
disclosing these risks. Zimmerman (1987, 131) observes “…despite the apparent unanimity of interest in and high 
value placed on risk communication, considerable disagreement occurs with respect to its goals or purpose.” 
Certainly, if managers are aware of the risks, it may be difficult to see the benefit of sharing these Achilles’ heels 
with the public. They may overlook the goodwill generated among investors should these disclosures demonstrate a 
commitment to transparency to the public. Managers may see only costs and negativity should they disclose these 
risks. They may fear that investors will view their firms not as open and honest, but as an unsafe investment – one 
burdened with risk. Outcomes arising from disclosure of IS/IT risks include negative market reaction or 
overreaction, display of weakness to competitors, and broadcasting of security weaknesses to potential hackers 
(Suijs, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2005; Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011) 
 
The last factor that may impede firms from implementing a comprehensive risk program is that they view 
the regulation as a compliance issue, rather than as an opportunity to enhance their business. This view focuses on 
satisfying the SEC by coming up with a list of plausible, generic risk factors that ostensibly meet the requirements of 
the regulation. A surface-only approach ignores the true value that firms can gain from a complete ERM 
implementation; however, given limited resources, it is one they might well choose. 
 
Thus, while we expect that the regulation will lead to improvements in the identification and disclosure of 
IS/IT risks, several factors may counter this expectation. At the same time, the nearly complete dependence of 
contemporary business on IS/IT, the ever increasing media coverage of IS/IT failures, and the requirements of 
Regulation S-K should demand that organizations pay attention to IS/IT risks. Accordingly, our first proposition is 
as follows: 
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P1  Pervasive dependence on IS/IT will increase the volume of IS/IT risks identified, and thus disclosed in 
response to regulation S-K. 
 
TRUST SERVICES FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSITION 2 
 
As noted earlier, dependence on IS/IT goes unnoticed, as long as all is working smoothly. By requiring 
firms to identify and disclose risks, Regulation S-K may provide the impetus for a thorough review of these systems. 
Several comprehensive governance frameworks are available to guide managers in conducting IS/IT risk 
assessments.  
 
The Trust Services Framework (TSF), developed jointly by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), provides a robust typology of 
risks. TSF comprises a set of core principles and criteria that directly address the reliability of a firm’s information 
technology and systems (AICPA & CICA, 2006). TSF provides a means to accommodate and categorize risk 
disclosures from firms and industries throughout the economy. The five fundamental TSF principles are security, 
availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy. Security is the foundational principal of the 
framework on which the other four depend (Romney & Steinbart, 2012). These five principals characterize controls 
and policies designed to identify and attenuate risk to both IS/IT operations and development processes. Availability 
refers to the accessibility of the system for processing, monitoring, and maintenance; processing integrity addresses 
the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of system processing; confidentiality refers to the protection of 
confidential firm information, and privacy focuses on the protection of information a firm holds regarding its 
customers, suppliers, and employees. Together, the five principles contribute to the ultimate goal of achieving 
systems integrity and minimizing systems risk exposures (AICPA & CICA, 2006). The professional guidance for 
identifying and addressing risks provided by TSF (Coe, 2005) makes it a strong candidate for firms to use when 
assessing their IS/IT risks. Thus, although other frameworks are available, TSF offers a robust yet parsimonious tool 
for our analysis.  
 
The existence of these (and other) frameworks provides a blueprint for managers to use when faced with 
identifying risks and developing risk disclosures. Regulation S-K motivates firms to seek out and implement these 
frameworks; the comprehensiveness of these frameworks increases the likelihood that management will identify a 
larger and more varied set of risk factors. 
 
P2 Regulations requiring the identification and disclosure of risk factors increase firms’ awareness of the 
variety of IS/IT-related risk factors facing them. 
 
Today, few firms are immune to IS/IT risks. In the past, only certain limited sectors were high-risk (e.g. 
medicine, defense, and the airlines); now, IS/IT dependence is critical to the success of the majority of sectors in the 
economy (Cavusoglu et al., 2004). The proliferation of IS/IT has been particularly significant in the financial 
services sector (Zhu et al., 2004). As noted previously, this sector has been subject to risk disclosure regulation since 
1997, and thus, it is reasonable to expect that some level of risk awareness and management is present. Research 
indicates, however, that 60% to 90% of all firms have experienced a major control failure or IS/IT security breach 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Romney & Steinbart, 2009; Kieke, 2006; Hines, 2007). This reality indicates that most all 
firms have some IS/IT risk exposure, which may or may not have been recognized before the failure.  
 
Clearly, there are variations both within and between industry sectors. Amazon.com is more dependent on 
IS/IT than more traditional bricks and mortar retailers, and farming less so than telecommunications. Nevertheless, 
the apparently inexorable rise of e-commerce, whether business-to-business or business-to-consumer, inevitably 
gives rise to a growing range of IS/IT risks for all industry sectors. IS/IT have become mission critical for a 
significant proportion of businesses in all sectors of the economy. Regulation S-K applies to all industry sectors and 
may, therefore, motivate firms to identify IS/IT risks not previously considered. Our third proposition addresses this 
expectation:   
 
P3 Regulations requiring the identification and disclosure of risk factors increase the awareness of IS/IT risks 
by firms across all industry sectors.  
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METHOD 
 
In order to test our propositions we evaluated the nature and scope of IS/IT risks disclosed in response to 
the S-K mandate. We first identified IS/IT-related risks and their position (relative to other risks) within firms’ 
annual reports. We then classified the identified and ranked risks into the five substantive categories included in the 
Trust Services Framework (TSF). In the third and final step, we used industry codes to explore the relationship 
between IS/IT-risk disclosure and industry sector as a means to test our last proposition.  
 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH  
 
We identified the Fortune 100 firms (ranked according to total sales) for the year 2004 (listed in Appendix 
A) and collected relevant data from the Compustat database.  We excluded five mutual insurance firms since they 
are not publicly traded: the first phase of our analysis began with an initial pool of 95 firms. We analyzed the 
records of these 95 firms over the three years 2004-2006. Various mergers further reduced our initial data set from 
95 firms to 93 in 2005 and 92 in 2006 (the first full year of implementation). For this analysis, the 280 10-K reports 
were used to gather industry code and text of item 1a (the location of the risk factor disclosures required by 
Regulation S-K).  
 
We categorized the textual data in two stages. First, we isolated IS/IT-related disclosures, then, we 
classified them using the principles embodied in the TSF (the coding scheme used is presented in Appendix B). 
Inter-rater agreement for the first phase was 97.2% and 87.3% for the second. Inter-rater reliability was Kappa = 
0.941, a very high level of agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977). Differences between coders were resolved through 
review and discussion between them and an independent expert in information systems.  
 
We then calculated the average position of the IS/IT-related disclosures relative to non-IS/IT-related 
disclosures. This aspect of our analytic approach was a response to the substantial challenges of developing 
measurement models for risk assessment identified by Debreceny (2006) and others. Clear distinction between 
levels of risk has intuitive appeal as highlighted by a study of the COBIT framework (Debreceny, 2006). Regulation 
S-K makes no mention of degree or importance of risks, nor does it require firms to specifically rate or rank risks. 
Thus, it provides no definitive method of judging the level of each risk relative to other risks. We compensated for 
this limitation by using the position (rank) of each classified disclosure in relation to others in Item 1a of the 10-K 
report: positional data such as rank provide a reasonable surrogate indicator of significance.  
 
RESULTS 
 
We identified 3,795 individual risk factors from the 280 documents analyzed. In 2004, only 68% of firms 
in the data set (65/95) reported one or more risk factors. This proportion rose to 100% in 2005 and continued at this 
level through 2006. During this period, the average number of risk factors per firm per year increased slightly, from 
13.28 in 2004 to 16.27 in 2006, as did the maximum number of risks per firm, from 41 to 48. Table 1 illustrates 
these trends.  
 
 
Table 1 
Total Risk Factors by Year 
 Number of risk 
factors 
Number of firms reporting 
at least one risk factor 
Mean number of 
risks per firm 
Standard Deviation Range 
2004 863 65 13.28 8.67 1-41 
2005 1435 93 15.43 8.23 1-42 
2006 1497 92 16.27 8.55 1-48 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1 presents a frequency distribution of these data. Although the upward trend is evident from the 
visible steps in the 11-20 and 21-30 ranges, we noted the very modest increase in the number of registrants reporting 
higher numbers of risk factors over time.  
 
Proposition 1:  Pervasive dependence on IS/IT will increase the volume of IS/IT risks identified, and thus disclosed 
in response to Regulation S-K 
 
The global data for all risk factors summarized above show that all firms reported at least one risk by the 
first full year of S-K implementation. However, the disclosure of IS/IT-related risks was relatively low. Only 18 
firms reported one or more IS/IT risk factor in 2004, 47 in 2005, and 55 in 2006: Table 2, Panel A provides an 
overview of this trend. The steady increase in the total number of risk factors reported (Table 1) seems mirrored here 
by an increase in the number of firms reporting at least one IS/IT risk factor. In 2004 (the year before the mandate), 
only 27.6% of Fortune 100 Regulation S-K eligible firms reporting risk factors reported any IS/IT risk factors. The 
proportion increased to 50.5% in 2005, and 59.8% in 2006. Nevertheless, we were surprised by the absence of any 
IS/IT risk factor disclosure from over 40% of the largest firms filing under Regulation S-K in 2006 (the first full 
year of the regulation).  
 
Table 2, Panel B presents the result of our analysis of the relation between the number and percentage of 
IS/IT-related disclosures to all risk disclosures. Although the number of risk disclosures overall increased, those 
related to IS/IT represented a relatively small proportion (3.6% of all risks disclosed over the three year period). 
This proportion has remained relatively static, increasing from 2.1% of the total number of risk factors disclosed in 
2004 to 3.6% in 2005 and 4.4% in 2006.  
 
These proportions are inconsistent with the dependencies and risks outlined in the introduction and the 
centrality of risk identification, assessment, and communication to management and governance of IS/IT. Our 
analysis shows that the proportion of IS/IT risk factor disclosure has increased: however, this increase is from such a 
very low initial threshold that is impossible to reconcile the increase with prior research into IS/IT risks and failure 
(Charette, 2005), which suggests large increases in IS/IT risk over the same period.  
 
Table 2, Panel B extends this analysis to summarize the positional (ranking) data we used as a proxy 
indicator of the significance of the risks disclosed: the average rank of non-IS/IT risks factors is 10.5, the average 
rank for IS/IT risk factors is 13.0. This analysis suggests that IS/IT risks appeared consistently later in the risk 
disclosures, suggesting that management considered them less significant than other risks. Once again, this seems 
counter-intuitive in the context of prior research and experience of IS/IT failures. 
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Based on the low incidence of reported IS/IT risks, and their later appearance in risk disclosures, and in 
light of only slight increases in the number of IS/IT risk factors disclosed, Regulation S-K has not appeared to 
improve identification and disclosure of IS/IT risk factors. We do not find support for P1. 
 
Table 2 
Prevalence of IS/IT Risk Disclosures 
Panel A 
Year 
Number of firms reporting at 
least one IS/IT risk 
Total number of firms reporting 
at least one risk factor 
%age of firms reporting at 
least one IS/IT risk 
2004 18 65 27.6% 
2005 47 93 50.5% 
2006 55 92 59.8% 
    
Panel B 
 Year Number of individual risks 
%age of total 
risks 
Average rank a 
IS/IT Risks 2004 18 2.1 14.4 
Non-IS/IT Risks 2004 845 97.9 10.0 
Total 2004 863 100  
     
IS/IT Risks 2005 51 3.6 12.4 
Non-IS/IT Risks 2005 1384 96.4 10.4 
Total 2005 1435 100  
     
IS/IT Risks 2006 66 4.4 13.1 
Non-IS/IT Risks 2006 1431 95.6 10.9 
Total 2006 1497 100  
     
IS/IT Risks Total 135 3.6 13.0 
Non-IS/IT Risks Total 3660 96.4 10.5 
Total Total 3795 100  
 
 
Proposition 2:  Regulations requiring the identification and disclosure of risk factors increase firms’ awareness of 
the variety of IS/IT-related risk factors facing them. 
 
This proposition addresses the distribution of IS/IT risks among the various risk areas. As noted earlier, 
several frameworks exist to assist firms in assessing IS/IT risks. COBIT, for example, derives 215 specific control 
objectives from 34 high-level IS/IT processes, which provides a comprehensive, yet highly detailed blueprint. TSF 
provides five general categories of IS/IT risks, which, given the content and number of risk factors in our 
population, provided a parsimonious yet sufficient tool for our analysis. 
 
Recall that the five fundamental principles TSF includes are security, availability, processing integrity, 
confidentiality, and privacy. TSF is a comprehensive instrument: guidelines for its use require that all five principles 
are a pre-requisite for systems reliability; yet, experts agree that entirely eliminating the risks accommodated by TSF 
is impossible (Romney & Steinbart, 2009). A benefit of TSF’s comprehensive nature is that it can accommodate any 
and all risks identified. A drawback of this is that the classifications in our coding schema (Appendix A) are not 
mutually exclusive: an individual risk factor could relate to more than one principle (e.g. the risk of system failure 
could relate to processing integrity and availability). Consequently, we include some risks in more than one 
category. 
 
The summary presented in Table 3 shows that issues relating to system availability represent a significant 
proportion of the IS/IT-risks disclosed, 29.7% of the total number of risk factors classified (232). Security was the 
next most significant factor according to this classification with 61 disclosures (26.2%), followed by processing 
integrity issues (25.8%), threats to confidentiality (9.5%) and privacy (8.6%).  
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IS/IT Risk Factor Categorization based on Trust Services Framework 
  # of factors (maximum of each type per firm) 
Year Totals IS/IT 
Disclosures/Categories Availability Security 
Processing 
Integrity Confidentiality Privacy 
2004 18 11 (1) 7 (1) 9 (1) 1 (1) 2 (1) 
2005 47 30 (2) 26 (2) 27 (2) 9 (1) 9 (2) 
2006 55 28 (2) 28 (2) 24 (3) 12 (2) 9 (1) 
 120/232(100%)* 69(30%) 61(26%) 60(26%) 22(9%) 20(9%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Changes in the distribution of these risk factors over time (Figure 2) show that disclosure of confidentiality 
and privacy risks increased as a percentage of total IS/IT risk factor disclosures over the three-year period.
1
 This 
trend indicates an increase in corporate awareness of these two types of IS/IT risks, providing support for our 
proposition that the regulation has improved understanding of the variety of risks facing firms. There appears to be 
some rebalancing of IS/IT risks reported. 
 
Proposition 3:  Regulations requiring the identification and disclosure of risk factors increase the awareness of 
IS/IT risks by firms across all industry sectors.  
 
In the third phase of our analysis, we reviewed variations between industries to test our proposition about 
the frequency and proportion of IS/IT risks disclosed. Our expectation was that firms in industries with greater 
reliance on and pervasiveness of IS/IT would report greater numbers (and/or a greater proportion) of IS/IT risks than 
firms in industries with less reliance on IS/IT. Table 4 lists the specific industries in which at least one firm reported 
IS/IT risks as at least 10% of their total risks reported (2004-2006). Of the 56 industries in our data set, only six 
industries surpassed this threshold. Table 4 shows these six industries in descending order of the percentage of total 
risk factors that are IS/IT-related: finance (25%), radio, TV, and electrical stores (25%), department stores (13.3%), 
hospital and medical service plans (12.4%), general medical and surgical hospitals (11%), and plastics (1%).  
                                                 
1
  None of the major privacy regulations was enacted during the period we examined. The Financial Modernization Act was 
implemented in 1999 and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act was first enacted in 1996 and revised in 2003. 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act was finalized in 2008. This act protects the privacy of student educational 
records, and does not affect the companies in our pool.  
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Some of our findings appear to support P3. Finance firms and hospital and medical service plans, whose 
operational processes depend heavily on IS/IT and are closely regulated, made the top of the list. Some retail stores 
(radio, TV, electrical and department) which depend on IS/IT to support operational processes central to revenue 
generation, purchasing, record keeping, and distribution also reported greater numbers and percentages of IS/IT 
risks. We expect regulation and dependence makes IS/IT risks ‘present’ in the minds of managers and thus makes 
identification and disclosure more likely.  
 
However, the finding that 50 industries out of the 56 analyzed (some 89%) list fewer than 10% of their 
risks as IS/IT-related was surprising. Telecommunications, insurance, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, and computers 
(including software) were included in the ‘less than 10%’ category. While we acknowledge that firms in these 
industries might be well placed to mitigate some IS/IT risks through avoidance or sharing, and that these firms may 
face a multitude of other risks, the proportion of IS/IT risks to total risks was surprising and at odds both with our 
proposition and the expectations that arise from prior research and experience.  
 
Further, we are at a loss to explain why 27 industries (48%) had no firms list even a single IS/IT risk. These 
industries include computer programming and data processing (106), public warehousing (86), guided missiles and 
space vehicles (51), television broadcasting (50), and meatpacking (43) – figures in parentheses show the total 
number of risk factors disclosed in Item 1a for 2004-2006. While the variations in the level of IS/IT dependence 
between industry sectors should affect the volume of risks identified and disclosed, our analysis reveals a rather 
alarming lack of consistency that merits further investigation.   
 
 
Table 4 
Average Risk Rank for Disclosed IS/IT Risks, by General Industry Groupings (NAICS) 
NAICS Industry Description Average IS Risk Rank 
423430 Computers & Software-Whsl 4.33 
523110 Commercial Banks 4.50 
334111 Electronic Computers 5.33 
336322 Motor Vehicle Part, Accessory 6.00 
517110 Phone Comm Ex Radiotelephone 6.00 
522291 Finance-Services 6.00 
444110 Lumber & Oth Bldg Matl-Retl 7.00 
452111 Department Stores 7.50 
523110 Security Brokers & Dealers 8.00 
622110 Gen Med & Surgical Hospitals 8.83 
3252 Plastic Matl, Synthetic Resin 9.00 
443112 Radio,TV, Cons Electr Stores 9.00 
515210 Cable And Other Pay TV Svcs 9.50 
325412 Pharmaceutical Preparations 9.86 
492110 Air Courier Services 10.00 
311930 Beverages 10.40 
445110 Grocery Stores 10.67 
522320 Finance-Services 12.00 
424210 Drugs And Proprietary-Whsl 12.38 
452990 Variety Stores 13.75 
524114 Hospital & Medical Svc Plans 16.09 
446110 Drug & Proprietary Stores 16.50 
324110 Petroleum Refining 18.00 
3341 Computer & Office Equipment 18.33 
511210 Prepackaged Software 20.00 
524113 Life Insurance 20.50 
33611 Motor Vehicles & Car Bodies 23.00 
524126 Fire, Marine, Casualty Ins 23.17 
334220 Radio, Tv Broadcast, Comm Eq 29.67 
334119 Computer Communication Equip 30.00 
 Overall Average 12.84 
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In a supplemental analysis, (see Table 5) we summarized variations between industry groupings using 
positional (rank) data as a surrogate indicator of significance to provided additional insight into industry differences. 
Lower values (towards the top of the table) indicate risks that appear earlier in the risk disclosure. For example, 
computer and software wholesalers list IS/IT risks earlier in the disclosure, while computer communication 
equipment retailers list those risks later.  
 
This phase of our analysis shows that the relative significance of risk disclosures varies between industry 
sectors: however, we discern no consistent pattern. Support for our proposition is equivocal.  
 
 
Table 5 
Specific Industries with Firms Disclosing IS/IT Risks Greater than 10% of Total Risks 
Total of 2004, 2005, and 2006 
Industry 
IS/IT risks 
(a) 
Non-IS/IT 
risks 
(b) 
Total risks 
(c) 
%age of total risks 
that are IS/IT (a/c) 
Finance-Services 12 36 48 25.0% 
Radio, TV, Cons Electr Stores 6 18 24 25.0% 
Department Stores 2 13 15 13.3% 
Hospital & Medical Svc Plans 11 78 89 12.4% 
Gen Med & Surgical Hospitals 6 48 54 11.1% 
Plastic Matl, Synthetic Resin 2 17 19 10.5% 
 
 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
 
The SEC designed Regulation S-K to improve risk communication by firms to investors and other external 
stakeholders. A necessary precursor to this communication is the identification and evaluation of risks by firm 
managers and accountants. Our results lead us to question whether the regulation provides a means to demonstrate 
visible compliance rather than effective risk management – a nod to communication, without full evaluation or 
intervention. Consequently, we question the value of Regulation S-K to stakeholders. Are managers implementing 
effective enterprise risk management procedures and communicating the results to the public, or is Regulation S-K 
an exercise in compliance?  
 
Our first proposition states that pervasive dependence on IS/IT and high levels of regulation will increase 
the volume of IS/IT risks identified, and thus disclosed in response to regulation S-K. Given what we know about 
IS/IT risks facing firms in the current technological environment, we expected to observe a number of IS/IT-related 
risk disclosures within firms’ annual reports, in response to Regulation S-K. We observed that over 40% of Fortune 
100 firms reported no IS/IT risks in either of the two years that risk disclosure was voluntary, and more telling, that 
this percentage held in the first full year that that the regulation was mandated. Regardless of the diligence of 
managers and IS/IT professionals, no system can be made 100% secure, making some exposure to IS/IT risk 
unavoidable (Bodin, Gordon, & Loeb, 2008). Granted, as discussed earlier, firms may indeed have implemented 
effective risk management programs, yet have chosen to keep their findings private, thus preventing us from 
observing results. However, if this is the case, Regulation S-K has not accomplished its mission of improving the 
flow of information to investors and other external stakeholders.  
 
Our second proposition states that regulations which require the identification and disclosure of risk factors 
increase firms’ awareness of the variety of IS/IT-related risk factors facing them. We tested this proposition by 
exploring the variation in the types of IS/IT risks disclosed. Using the five TSF principles as a classification system, 
we found that two areas, confidentiality and privacy, were increasing as a proportion of total IS/IT risks reported 
over time. This observation supports increased awareness of these two areas. We did observe declines in the 
proportion of risks related to availability, security, and processing integrity, however, because the absolute number 
of IS/IT risks increased, increased awareness of the other two areas did not come at a cost to these three areas. 
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Our analysis of the variation in IS/IT risks finds that threats to availability of systems are reported most 
often. Since so many business processes rely on IS/IT, availability is critical. In IS/IT-dependent business sectors 
such as financial services and healthcare, unavailable systems prevent revenue from being earned and/or collected, 
payroll from being processed, bills from being paid, and a host of other activities from continuing. Compared with 
the other threats, we perceive system availability to be the most significant and prior research (Meall 2009) supports 
this perception. However, despite the clear prevalence of these risks in our analysis, we believe that they are still 
significantly under-represented. Two factors prompt this observation. First, the rate of change in the number of these 
risk factors over time (see Table 2) suggests persistent under-reporting. Second, we find it difficult to comprehend 
how managers within industries that are ostensibly “risk free” in regards to IS/IT according to their disclosures – 
including computer programming and data processing, and guided missiles - are failing to acknowledge their 
dependence on IS/IT to support mission critical business processes. This issue is addressed in our third proposition, 
that Regulation S-K will increase IS/IT risk disclosure across industries.  
 
We cannot support the assumption that firms believe they have mitigated the risk: a recent study found that 
69% of business leaders indicate that threats to IS/IT continuity represent a clear and present danger (Hodge 
2007).We conclude that the risks themselves have been insufficiently analyzed in-house and are therefore under-
appreciated, evidenced by the low rate of reporting. This observation concurs with Benaroch et al. (2006) who found 
that managers in a financial services setting relied on intuition to assess IS/IT investment risk rather than on any 
formal method or framework.  
 
One explanation for the scarcity of IS/IT risk factor disclosures is that Regulation S-K serves the needs of 
representation before those of intervention. In other words, firms are merely complying with a directive, rather than 
embracing a new process (enterprise risk management). Firms enact compliance with Regulation S-K by aligning 
their actions with those of firms in their own or a similar industry (Miller and O’Leary 2007), meeting the technical 
requirements of their regulators, or addressing the demands of their market.  
 
Such behavior gives rise to conceptualization of regulations as what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call an 
‘iron cage’. Regulation promotes institutionalization and bureaucratization, which becomes a powerful means of 
controlling individuals, to such an extent that it acts as a cage rather than a rationalist organizing framework or form 
(Weber 1952). Individual thought becomes imprisoned in the need to ‘box-check’, audit reports default to 
standardized formats, and firms rigidly conform to rituals prescribed by the state, professions, and competition 
(Power 2009; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Our findings provide some evidence that disclosures made in response to 
Regulation S-K reflect regulatory compliance more so than a holistic risk management strategy. 
 
We have examined the effects of Regulation S-K on IS/IT-related risk disclosures, and in doing so add to 
our understanding of its strengths and limitations. The strength of regulatory uniformity arises from codification and 
systematization – the presentation of order. The weakness is the tendency for users of the regulation to conform 
rather than inform – that is to say, to comply with the minutiae of the regulation, rather than use the regulatory 
framework as a guide to investigate, explore, and expand the representation to accommodate known and emerging 
risks. The uniformity and codification of S-K and other regulatory instruments become an end rather than a means to 
an end. In this situation, regulatory instruments can act like cages rather than frameworks. 
 
This outcome may be symptomatic of tension between the need to comply and the need to appear to 
comply with the regulation, while at the same time presenting data that are valid, but which do not jeopardize 
potential investment.  
 
What is clear from the disclosure practices we report is that the effectiveness of the S-K regulation is open 
to question. The objective of the regulation is to provide information to investors and other external parties 
regarding the risk exposure of a firm. The archival data used to test our propositions cast doubt on whether firms are 
truly informing: identifying risks, exploring their causes and effects, putting in place processes and strategies to 
mitigate them, and advising regulators and investors of their actions - or are merely conforming: disclosing the 
minimum required to comply with Regulation S-K. If, as Power (2009) observes, risk management is less about 
managing risk and more about gaining institutionalized legitimacy, should we not expect the same from risk 
management disclosure?  
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Future research should explore the connections (or lack thereof) between firms’ established enterprise risk 
management processes and their S-K risk disclosures. Questions may include, ‘who creates and approves the risk 
disclosure?’ and ‘how much does the disclosure change from year-to-year in response to new risks identified or old 
risks mitigated?’ Behavioral analyses using interviews and surveys would be appropriately rich methodologies for 
these explorations.  
 
Further research might adopt a ‘user’ or consumer perspective, asking investors whether they read risk 
disclosures, and if they do how those disclosures influence their investing decisions. If investors are not using risk 
disclosures, is it due to a lack of awareness that they exist, a lack of trust in their veracity, or a lack of useful 
information provided? For example, if there is no differentiation in risk factor disclosures among competing 
investments (firms), then the value-relevance of the disclosure for investment decisions is nil. To answer questions 
about the variety of risk disclosures will require extensive analysis, but should prove fruitful. 
 
Further research might also explore the value of risk disclosures ‘post-event.’ In other words, does the 
disclosure of specific risk factors lessen legal liability in shareholder lawsuits?  
 
Overall, research that addresses the effectiveness of Regulation S-K is clearly worthwhile and timely. 
Results and conclusions would, we anticipate, highlight a rather naïve sense of security in the published disclosures 
and inform the SEC and government regulators about the efficacy and value of this regulation, and may provide the 
impetus to managers to take a closer look at risk management within their firms. 
 
Finally, we suggest that our study demonstrates the potential and wider applicability of the notion of 
mediating (Miller and O’Leary, 2007) or, perhaps, ‘remediating’ instruments. Such a perspective provides a warning 
to risk managers that mimicking peers may leave you exposed to unidentified risks: it is unrealistic to rely on others 
to disclose or even to identify risks. It also reiterates the mutual dependence of representation and intervention, 
raising questions that prompt even deeper review of regulations and their effectiveness - did the SEC intend this 
outcome? Do significant and serious risks remain unidentified or undisclosed – and can we tell? Does the current 
risk disclosure process help the firm and the investing public?  
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APPENDIX A 
Listing of Firms Studied – 2005 Fortune 100 (based on 2004 reports) 
1 Wal-Mart 34 Dow Chemical 67 Sprint  
2 Exxon 35 
Albertson's (sold to Supervalu 
on June 2, 2006)3 68 New York Life Insurance1 
3 General Motors 36 Morgan Stanley 69 Viacom 
4 Ford 37 MetLife 70 International Paper 
5 GE 38 Walgreen 71 Johnson Controls 
6 Chevron 39 United Technologies 72 Tyson Foods 
7 ConocoPhillips 40 United Health Group 73 Caremark 
8 Citigroup 41 Microsoft 74 JC Penney 
9 AIG 42 United Parcel Service 75 Honeywell 
10 Intl. Business Machines 43 Lowe's  76 Ingram Micro 
11 Hewlett-Packard 44 Archer Daniels Midland 77 Best Buy 
12 Berkshire Hathaway 45 Sears Roebuck 78 FedEx 
13 Home Depot 46 Safeway 79 Alcoa 
14 Verizon  47 Lockheed Martin 80 HCA  
15 McKesson 48 Medco Health Solutions 81 TIAA-CREF1 
16 Cardinal Health 49 Motorola 82 Sunoco 
17 Altria 50 Intel 83 Mass Mutual Life1 
18 Bank of America 51 Allstate 84 Merck 
19 State Farm Insurance1 52 Wells Fargo 85 St. Paul Travelers 
20 JP Morgan Chase 53 Merrill Lynch 86 Duke Energy 
21 Kroger 54 Walt Disney 87 BellSouth 
22 Valero Energy 55 CVS 88 Hartford Financial  
23 AmerisourceBergen 56 
AT&T (merged with #33 SBC 
to form AT&T Inc) 89 Weyerhaeuser 
24 Pfizer 57 Caterpillar 90 
MCI (merged with Verizon, last filing 
12/29/04)2 
25 Boeing 58 Northrop Grumman 91 Cisco 
26 Procter & Gamble 59 Goldman Sachs 92 Coca-Cola 
27 Target 60 Sysco 93 Bristol-Myers Squibb 
28 Dell 61 PepsiCo 94 Lehman Brothers 
29 Costco Wholesale 62 American Express 95 Electronic Data Systems 
30 Johnson & Johnson 63 Delphi 96 Plains All American Pipeline 
31 Marathon Oil 64 Prudential Financial 97 WellPoint  
32 Time Warner 65 Wachovia 98 News Corp 
33 
SBC Communications (Merged 
with AT&T in 11/05)2 66 DuPont 99 Nationwide Insurance1 
    100 Abbott Laboratories 
1Dropped from original pool (insurance firms) 
2Merged or failed in 2005 
3Merged in 2006 
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APPENDIX B 
AICPA Trust Services Principles description used to classify Risk Disclosures 
Security The system is protected against unauthorized access (both physical and logical). 
Availability The system is available for operation and use as committed or agreed. 
Processing 
Integrity 
System processing is complete, accurate, timely, and authorized. 
Confidentiality Information designated as confidential is protected as committed or agreed. 
Privacy 
Personal information is collected, used, retained, disclosed, and destroyed in conformity with the 
commitments in the entity’s privacy notice and with criteria set forth in generally accepted privacy 
principles issued by the AICPA and CICA. 
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APPENDIX C 
Examples of Risk Disclosures categorized by Trust Services Principles 
Principle Risk Disclosure Example 
Security 
If we are unable to protect our information systems against data corruption, cyber-based attacks or 
network security breaches, our operations could be disrupted.  
We are increasingly dependent on information technology networks and systems, including the Internet, to 
process, transmit and store electronic information. In particular, we depend on our information technology 
infrastructure for digital marketing activities and electronic communications among our locations around 
the world and between Company personnel and our bottlers, other customers and suppliers. Security 
breaches of this infrastructure can create system disruptions, shutdowns or unauthorized disclosure of 
confidential information. If we are unable to prevent such breaches, our operations could be disrupted or 
we may suffer financial damage or loss because of lost or misappropriated information. 
Availability 
Infrastructure failures could harm our business. We depend on our information technology and 
manufacturing infrastructure to achieve our business objectives. If a problem, such as a computer virus, 
intentional disruption by a third party, natural disaster, manufacturing failure, or telephone system failure 
impairs our infrastructure, we may be unable to book or process orders, manufacture, and ship in a timely 
manner or otherwise carry on our business. An infrastructure disruption could cause us to lose customers 
and revenue and could require us to incur significant expense to eliminate these problems and address 
related security concerns. The harm to our business could be even greater if it occurs during a period of 
disproportionately heavy demand. 
Processing 
Integrity 
We outsource and obtain certain information technology systems or other services from independent third 
parties, and also delegate selected functions to independent practice associations and specialty service 
providers; portions of our operations are subject to their performance. 
Although we take steps to monitor and regulate the performance of independent third parties who provide 
services to us or to whom we delegate selected functions, these arrangements may make our operations 
vulnerable if those third parties fail to satisfy their obligations to us, whether because of our failure to 
adequately monitor and regulate their performance, or changes in their own financial condition or other 
matters outside our control. In recent years, certain third parties to whom we delegated selected functions, 
such as independent practice associations and specialty services providers, have experienced financial 
difficulties, including bankruptcy, which may subject us to increased costs and potential network 
disruptions, and in some cases cause us to incur duplicative claims expense. 
Certain legislative authorities have in recent periods also discussed or proposed legislation that would 
restrict outsourcing and, if enacted, could materially increase our costs. We also could become overly 
dependent on key vendors, which could cause us to lose core competencies if not properly monitored. 
Confidentiality 
The success of our business depends on maintaining a well-secured pharmacy operation and technology 
infrastructure.  
We are dependent on our infrastructure, including our information systems, for many aspects of our 
business operations. A fundamental requirement for our business is the secure storage and transmission of 
personal health information and other confidential data. Our business and operations may be harmed if we 
do not maintain our business processes and information systems, and the integrity of our confidential 
information. Although we have developed systems and processes that are designed to protect information 
against security breaches, failure to protect such information or mitigate any such breaches may adversely 
affect our operations. Malfunctions in our business processes, breaches of our information systems or the 
failure to maintain effective and up-to-date information systems could disrupt our business operations, 
result in customer and member disputes, damage our reputation, expose us to risk of loss or litigation, 
result in regulatory violations, increase administrative expenses or lead to other adverse consequences.  
Privacy 
An increase in account data breaches and fraudulent activity using our cards could lead to reputational 
damage to our brand and could reduce the use and acceptance of our charge and credit cards.  
We and other third parties store Card member account information in connection with our charge and 
credit cards. Criminals are using increasingly sophisticated methods to capture various types of 
information relating to Card members’ accounts, including Membership Rewards accounts, to engage in 
illegal activities such as fraud and identity theft. As outsourcing and specialization become a more 
acceptable way of doing business in the payments industry, there are more third parties involved in 
processing transactions using our cards. If data breaches or fraud levels involving our cards were to rise, it 
could lead to regulatory intervention (such as mandatory card reissuance) and reputational and financial 
damage to our brand, which could reduce the use and acceptance of our cards, and have a material adverse 
impact on our business. 
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NOTES 
